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INTRODUCTION
Bankruptcy law permits an individual to discharge many but not 
all debts so that a person can recover from misfortune. However, 
debtors can be denied discharge altogether on account of some 
types of misconduct, such as hiding assets from the bankruptcy 
court or carrying speciic debts based on various public policies. 
For example, child support payments, many tax debts, and debts 
arising from malicious torts are not dischargeable. This case 
concerns an exception from discharge for debts arising from “false 
pretenses, a false representation, or actual fraud.” Regardless of 
whether the false statements are oral or written, such debts are 
generally not dischargeable provided the creditor justiiably relied 
on them. Some unscrupulous creditors developed the practice 
of having debtors provide credit information on forms making 
it dificult to be complete and accurate, speciically to make the 
debts nondischargeable on the claim that they were secured by 
misrepresentations. Congress therefore tightened the standard for 
nondischargeability where the creditor is claiming a misstatement 
with respect to the debtor’s inancial condition, requiring not only 
that the statement be in writing, but that the creditor prove that 
it reasonably relied on that information. This case addresses the 
scope of representations covered by this higher standard: whether a 
statement by the debtor about a particular asset is a statement “with 
respect to” the debtor’s “inancial condition.” 
ISSUE
Does a false statement about a single asset fall within the 
general standard for nondischargeability of debts arising from 
false representations or fraud, or is it instead covered by the 
speciic provision for false statements “respecting the debtor’s 
or an insider’s inancial condition,” which imposes additional 
requirements on the creditor seeking to have the claim held 
nondischargeable? 
FACTS
In 2004, R. Scott Appling (respondent) retained Lamar, Archer & 
Cofrin, LLP (Lamar or petitioner) to represent him in commercial 
litigation. By 2005, he had paid $135,000 in fees and owed another 
$60,000. Although the testimony is in conlict, the bankruptcy court 
apparently concluded that, during a meeting in March 2005 to 
discuss the growing balance, Appling told Lamar that his accountant 
said he would be able to ile amended tax returns and recover a 
refund of more than $100,000. Lamar knew that Appling had no 
other unencumbered assets, but continued to work on the case 
based on this representation. In a meeting that November, according 
to Lamar, Appling said that the accountant had made an error on 
the return and Appling had not yet received the refund. In fact, 
he had received the refund, of $59,000, the month before. In early 
2006, the litigation settled, and soon thereafter Lamar learned that 
Appling had already received the tax refund and it was not available 
to pay the irm’s fees. In 2012, Lamar sued Appling for the unpaid 
fees, obtaining a judgment for over $104,000. Appling and his wife 
then iled for bankruptcy, and Lamar asserted that its claim was 
not dischargeable because the debt was a result of Appling’s “false 
pretenses, a false representation, or actual fraud.” 
CASE ANALYSIS
Section 523(a)(2)(A) of the Bankruptcy Code provides that an 
individual cannot discharge a debt “for money, property, services, 
or an extension, renewal, or reinancing of credit, to the extent 
obtained by…false pretenses, a false representation, or actual 
fraud, other than a statement respecting the debtor’s or an insider’s 
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inancial condition.” If the false statement regards “the debtor’s 
or an insider’s inancial condition,” then Section 523(a)(2)(B) 
provides that the debt can be discharged, but only if the creditor can 
show that the statement was in writing, materially false, and made 
with intent to deceive, and that the creditor reasonably relied on the 
statement. 
The Bankruptcy Court held that Appling’s comments about the 
tax refund were not statements respecting his inancial condition 
because they did not address his “overall inancial condition or net 
worth” and were therefore not subject to the higher standards of 
Section 523(a)(2)(B). In other words, these statements justiied 
denying the discharge of his debt to Lamar even though the 
statements were not in writing. The district court agreed, but the 
Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals reversed, holding that a statement 
about a single asset can be a statement respecting the debtor’s 
inancial condition and thus Section 523(a)(2)(B) applied. The 
court explained that the statute was “unambiguous” and that while 
“inancial condition” likely refers to net worth, a statement about an 
asset is one “respecting” inancial condition because it is related to 
or affects the debtor’s net worth. A contrary reading, the court held, 
would give no meaning to the word “respecting.” 
The Eleventh Circuit’s decision was consistent with Engler v. Van 
Steinburg, 744 F.2d 1060 (4th Cir. 1984), in which the court held 
that a debtor’s statement that he owned a property free and clear of 
liens was a statement respecting his inancial condition. However, 
these decisions are in conlict with In re Joelson, 427 F.3d 700 
(10th Cir. 2005) (holding that statements about speciic assets that 
could serve as collateral for a loan were not statements respecting 
the debtor’s inancial condition because they did not purport to 
address her “overall inancial health”) and In re Bandi, 683 F.3d 
671 (5th Cir. 2012), cert. denied, 568 U.S. 1086 (2013) (holding that 
representations that the debtor owned certain real estate were not 
statements respecting the debtor’s inancial condition).
Both parties agree that “inancial condition,” as used in the statute, 
refers to the aggregate of the debtor’s assets and liabilities, or the 
debtor’s overall inancial health or net worth. The disagreement 
arises over the meaning of “respecting…inancial condition.” 
Appling argues that “respecting” is consistently used in law as 
a broadening term, like “related to.” Thus, he argues, the First 
Amendment prohibition on any law “respecting the establishment 
of religion” extends beyond statutes that would actually establish a 
national religion. In interpreting the Civil Rights Act, Appling notes, 
the Court has said that “with respect to voting” means having a 
“direct relation to, or impact on, voting.” 
Lamar argues that “respecting” is an ambiguous term that can 
mean “about” or “concerning” or “regarding” and, in light of the 
history of the Bankruptcy Code, should not be read expansively. 
Congress intended to limit Section 523(a)(2)(B) to statements 
about the debtor’s overall inancial health. Statements “respecting” 
inancial condition are more than “statements of inancial 
condition,” which might have been read to be limited to formal 
inancial statements or balance sheets, but should not be read to 
sweep in every statement about an asset or a debt. The Section 
covers a statement like “Don’t worry, I am above water,” as it is 
about the debtor’s overall inancial condition, Lamar argues. But 
Lamar asserts reading Section 523(a)(2)(B) to cover any statement 
that can have an effect on net worth ignores Congressional intent in 
limiting the provision to statements about “inancial condition.” 
Appling disagrees, noting that while statements about assets or 
liabilities are statements respecting the debtor’s inancial condition, 
there are still a wide range of misrepresentations that fall outside 
the limits of Section 523(a)(2)(B). Reported cases include 
misrepresentations by debtors of their professional qualiications, 
skills, or experience; the intended use of borrowed funds; and the 
costs of materials, for example. Thus, the limitation to statements 
respecting “inancial condition” has meaning even if it covers all 
statements about individual assets.
Moreover, Appling argues, the statute must be read in light of pre-
Code law. Under a 1903 statute, the Bankruptcy Act denied discharge 
to a person who made materially false statements in writing to the 
creditor. Courts held, however, that false representations to credit 
rating agencies, like Dun’s, were not “made to” the creditor and 
thus did not block the debtor’s discharge. In 1926, Congress closed 
this loophole, barring discharge where a person obtained credit 
“by making or publishing, or causing to be made or published in 
any manner whatsoever, a materially false statement in writing 
respecting his inancial condition.” In interpreting this statute, 
courts held that statements regarding speciic assets were covered 
by the language “respecting his inancial condition.” Appling argues 
that Congress was aware of this interpretation when it adopted the 
nondischargeability provisions in Section 523. 
Lamar’s rebuttal is based on the premise that bankruptcy is intended 
to provide a discharge to the honest but unfortunate debtor, not to 
those who commit fraud, and the broad reading given to “respecting 
his inancial condition” under the pre-Code statute worked against 
those who had committed fraud. Under the current statute, a broad 
reading makes it easier for a person who committed fraud to get a 
discharge. Thus, he argues, it cannot be assumed that Congress 
intended the pre-Code cases to govern. 
SIGNIFICANCE 
The case presents a direct circuit split on an issue that regularly 
arises. The National Federation of Independent Business iled an 
amicus brief arguing that the Eleventh Circuit’s ruling would create 
a tremendous burden on small businesses that often extend credit 
based on oral representations and would, under its ruling, often 
be unable to raise these oral misrepresentations as a basis for 
nondischargeability. While there might be some truth to this, the 
number of cases involved is likely modest, particularly given the 
costs of contesting dischargeability and the fact that the discharge 
provisions apply only to debts owed by individuals, not those owed by 
business entities like corporations or LLCs.
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